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Abstract: 
In terms of Islamic banking, which relies on three main pillar of prohibiting Riba, Gharar& Maysir, risk 
management is still not sufficiently developed. Indeed, Islamic use traditional types of risk management 
instruments used by conventional banks. Despite Islamic banking has a specific characteristic related 
essentially to the Profit & Loss Sharing (PLS) principle in Mudarabah & Musharakah contracts. Such 
instruments change the classic concept of risk in comparison with conventional banks adding new types of 
risk such as Commodity/Asset price risk and Bundled risk along with neutralizing other type of risks like the 
liquidity risk.  
Nevertheless, the rigidity of some Sharia’a scholars has impeded some financial instruments that try to 
match the real risk management demands by business entities in the global Islamic finance industry. Indeed, 
it has been widely acknowledged by many observers that the Islamic finance industry will not be able to 
sustainably continue on this growth trajectory, and may even regress, without a proper market risk 
management framework that can effectively deal with the complex risks that exist in today’s globalized 
economy (Chapra& Khan, 2000; Moody's, 2010).The present research article is an attempt to analyze 
hedging instruments from an Islamic finance perspective. It will approach different fiqhi ruling on them 
along with the applicability of these instruments in the reality.  
 
Key Words: Risk Management, Islamic Finance, Hedging, Futures. 
 
Résumé : 
En ce qui concerne la finance islamique, qui se base sur trois piliers principaux à savoir la prohibition du 
riba, gharar &maysir, la gestion des risques n’est pas encore efficacement développée. En effet, les banques 
islamiques font appel aux instruments financiers utilisés par les banques traditionnelles. Sachant que les 
banques islamiques ont un caractère spécifique liée au principe du partage des profits et des pertes dans les 
contrats mudarabah et musharakah. Ce principe change, en effet, la définition usuelle du risque connue 
jusqu’à présent dans le secteur conventionnel, ce qui peut ajouter d’autres types de risques liés aux risque 
d’actifs mais aussi ceci peut permettre de neutraliser d’autres risques comme celui lié à la liquidité.  
Pourtant, la rigidité de certains spécialistes de la shari’ah à entraver l’essor des instruments de couverture 
contre les risques qui essayent de répondre à la demande des acteurs de la finance islamique. Par 
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conséquent, la majorité des instruments de couverture conventionnels ont été bannis même si ils ont pour but 
une couverture contre des risques réels et n’ont pas pour la spéculation.   
Beaucoup d’observateurs ont conclu que la finance islamique ne saura pas garder un niveau croissant 
de développement sans avoir un marché d’instruments dérivés compatibles à la shari’ah qui peuvent 
répondre au caractère complexe du risque sur les marchés au risque de voir l’industrie régresser (Chapra& 
Khan, 2000 ; Moody’s, 2010). Le rapport suivant est une tentative d’analyser la pratique de couverture des 
risques financiers en finance islamique et plus précisément les contrats Futures liés au huile du palmier brut. 
Ce dernier va aborder les différents points de vue d’un point de vue shari’ah et de l’efficience économique 
de ces contrats et leur retombés sur l’économie réelle ce qui peut soutenir ou réfuter les points de vue actuel 
sur le sujet. 
Mots Clés : Gestion des risques, Finance islamique, Futures, couverture. 
 
Introduction: 
The globalization of financial markets since the 
80s, the emergence on new financial institutions 
and the development of new information 
technologies have amplified the risks endured by 
institutions and precisely banks for the reason that 
risk is in the main component of the value creation 
to the shareholders. Historically speaking, 
Modigliani-Miller theorem have consisted that the 
value of a ﬁrm is independent of its risk structure; 
ﬁrm should simply maximize expected proﬁt, 
regardless of the risk entailed; the value creation 
is simply generated through optimal allocation of 
resources. However, the variety of markets’ biases 
cause the M&M theorem to fail and create a role 
for risk management. The dictionary of Financial 
Terms defines Risk as the possibility you'll lose 
money if an investment you make provides a 
disappointing return. All investments carry a 
certain level of risk, since investment return is not 
guaranteed, it may be resumed as the uncertainty 
regarding future incomes. Thus, risk management 
takes a central role in banks daily work and they 
need to have some process of risk management. 
Islamic finance is a rapidly growing part of the 
financial sector in the world. Moreover, Islamic 
finance industry has overtaken interest outside 
Muslim world. More recently, conventional 
financial markets seem to show keen interest in 
IF. Its stability and resilience during the 08 
financial crisis have provided a safe alternative for 
many investors. 
The impressive growth track of Islamic banking 
over the last few years has created high 
expectations in the stake-holders and has 
compelled the major players of the banking 
industry, investors as well as regulators and 
government to view it as a separate segment in the 
banking industry. In addition to that, we count 
more than 700 Islamic Financial Institutions are  
 
operating across the globe with around US$1.2 
trillion1 assets under management in more than 85 
countries essentially the nine core markets 
(Bahrain, Qatar, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, 
Malaysia, United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Kuwait 
and Pakistan). Together, they account for 93% of 
industry assets, estimated to exceed US$920 
billion2 in 2015. Financial Institutions from 
Middle East, Far East, US and Europe to Africa, 
South and Central Asian republics are offering 
Islamic banking services. The industry is growing 
at a rate of roughly 15-203 percent per year, and 
could serve 40 to 50 percent of the world's 
Muslim population within a decade. According to 
a recent estimate by Standards & Poors the market 
potential for Islamic banks is estimated at $ 4 
trillion. 
During the last two decades, Islamic banks created 
many creative profit-sharing instruments that 
enabled them to compete with their counterparts. 
However, this attempt to maximize their Return 
on Assets (ROA), Islamic financial institutions is 
exposed to risks. Indeed, The annual reports of 
Islamic banks worldwide for the period between 
2004 and 2011 on 65 full-fledge Islamic banks 
across the globe concluded that credit risk and 
interaction between credit risk and rate of interest 
risk have significant negative impact on the return 
on assets (ROA) which is a main indicators of 
banks’ profitability. Consequently, the 
implementation of a risk management process in 
the Islamic banks is linked directly to their 
performance. Also, Bank Negara Malaysia stated 
that International Regulators must pay put effort 
in studying risk affecting the banking industry. To 
                                                             
1 Ahmed Ali Siddiqui, Executive Vice President, Product 
Development &Shariah Compliance, Meezan Bank Limited 
2 World Islamic Banking Competitiveness Report 2016 
3
fourth edition of the Islamic Financial Services Board’s (IFSB) Islamic 
Financial Services Industry Stability Report 
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quote “An increase in interest rate would trigger 
credit risk as it leads to an increase in the number 
of loan defaults, the increase in interest rate could 
also lead to liquidity problems.” 
As hedging provides protection for economic 
agents, it would not seem surprising that it should 
fall into one Maqasid Al-shari’ah which is the 
preservation of wealth. Hence, Islamic finance 
offers various instruments for hedging purposes as 
the complexity of international markets give rise 
to new typology of risk. Obaidullah (2005) rightly 
notes, “The provision of hedging facility is hardly 
an adequate rationale for tolerating Qimar and 
Maysir. The Shari’ah does not disapprove of 
hedging, since it brings in some It is the zero-sum 
nature of the game that the Shari’ah finds 
objectionable, as in it lie the roots of social 
disharmony and discord.” Thus, the necessity of 
hedging is crucial to protect the wealth as it falls 
into Maqasid Al-shari’ah. However, conventional 
instruments, mainly derivatives, cannot separate 
hedging from speculation. 
This paper will try to approach the concept of 
hedging in Islamic finance along with presenting 
the different instruments offered to mitigate risk. 
For that, the first part of this paper will emphasize 
on the notion of risk in Islam then, it will be 
question of presenting the available tool of 
hedging on the market along with the main 
shari’ah issues around them. 
The Notion of Risk in Islam: 
The necessity to take risk is in the core of value 
creation in any nation. In fact, on one hand experts 
and specialists agree that no economic growth can 
take place without taking risks. “Nothing ventured 
nothing gained” is the first principle of 
investment. (Al-Suwailem, 2006b). Hence, Islam 
put risk in the core of its concern by emphasizing 
and insisting on equity-based financing to 
simulate growth and prosperity. 
Muslim jurists use bothkhatar(Risk)and 
mukhatarah (Risk taking) for business risk. 
Mukhatarah is defined as “possibility of 
unexpected outcomes” (Al-Sharbasi, 1981). 
Khatar and mukhatarah are interchangeably used 
with gharar (Uwaidah, 2010).(Al-Amine, 
2008)concludes that the concept of risk according 
to Muslim jurists is almost similar to what is 
defined by conventional economists. However, 
some might argue that there is a distinction 
between the concept of risk as khatar and the 
concept of gharar. The response to that from 
Islamic finance perspective is that the first notion 
refers to a tolerated level of gharar which exist in 
every commercial transaction. While gharar as 
that element of uncertainty in exchange 
transactions in case spotted in a contract make it 
void from Shari'ah point of view is the excessive 
type to which hedging does not apply.  
Risk is an essential component of all Islamic 
transaction as no one can claim any compensation 
without bearing risk. Indeed, under the rules of 
shari’ah, return is directly linked to the exposure 
of an ex ante investment risks according to the 
fiqhi rule “al-ghounmu bil al-ghourm”. Also, 
returns assume liability “Al-kharaju bi Daman” 
meaning that any profit occurs after a liability. As 
for the typology of risk, Ibn Taymiah (728H – 
1328G) cited that risk falls into two categories: 
commercial risk, where one would buy a 
commodity in order to sell it for profit, and rely on 
Allah for that. This risk is necessary for 
merchants, and although the probability of loss 
exists, but this is the nature of commerce. The 
other type of risk is that of gambling, which 
implies eating wealth for nothing. This is what 
Allah and his Messenger (peace be upon him) 
have prohibited. 
If we define risk as possibility of loss, then it 
becomes clear from an Islamic perspective that 
risk as such is not desirable as Islam through 
Maqasid Al-shari’ah (Supreme goals of Islam) 
clearly call for the preservation and development 
of wealth. Exposing wealth to loss cannot be a 
goal in itself. In fact, al-Qarafi clearly states that 
i.e. protection of wealth, is desirable for rational 
agents (Al-Suwailem, 2006a).  
The legal maxims that frame the notion of risk in 
Islamic law can be presented as follow: 
Islamic scholars have come up with three legal 
maxims that frame the practice of risk 
management within IFIs. In this section three 
legal maxims are discussed with reference to its 
application in the industry. 
 Harm is to be eliminated (لازي ررضلا) 
This maxim provided by the lawgiver is either to 
secure benefit or to prevent harm. The element 
that brings harm to the community should be 
eliminated. The word darar means danger and 
injury. Thus, this maxim aims to secure public 
benefit and flexibility and avoids rigidity and 
complexity. As risk matches the definition of 
harm and danger, it is encouraged to managed by 
the mean of risk sharing not risk shifting.  
 Benefit goes with liability ( اب جارخلانامضل ) 
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Linguistically in the Arabic language, 
kharajmeans yield and return and Daman refers to 
liability and responsibility4 with different other 
meaning in Islamic fiqh. However, in this case, its 
meaning is the liability of the asset in case it is 
damage or destroyed. As liability comes always 
with risk, mitigating it is an important element 
based on this maxim. Additionally, Islamic law 
links return and liability which falls into most of 
commercial transaction as no one can claim any 
compensation without taking any risk. 
 Liability accompanies gain (منغلاب مرغلا) 
This maxim can be considered as an inverse or 
extension of the previous maxim. The general 
meaning of this maxim is that the owner should 
bear all risks and costs that attend ownership of 
the asset since he is entitled to enjoy any benefit 
resulting from it (Abdallah, Hassan, & 
McClelland, 2015). 
Hedging in Islamic Finance: 
A hedge is a position established in one market 
usually in the context of one’s commercial 
activity, in an attempt to offset exposure to the 
price risk of an equal but opposite obligation or 
position in another market (Zahan, S. Kenett, 
2011). Hence, the practice of hedging aims to 
protect an investment against the risk of a 
probable loss due to the markets fluctuations. 
Varieties of these instruments are traded both in 
the conventional as well as in Islamic financial 
markets such as SWAPs, Futures, Islamic FX 
forward and Islamic profit rate SWAP. Despite 
the fact that the majority of Shari’ah standard-
setting authorities agree on the need of hedging, 
divergences still remain concerning the legality 
and Shari’ah compliance of certain Islamic 
hedging instruments. 
This reserve is relatively justified for the reason 
that hedging instruments are the main reason 
behind the 08 financial collapses. Indeed, the 
practice of hedging caused the 2008 financial 
crisis amplifying the risk in the financial 
markets. The risk taking of hedge funds was more 
dangerous than other financial institutions because 
they used the mechanism leverage using 
sophisticated derivatives to borrow money. That 
created higher returns in a good market and 
greater losses in a bad one. As a result, the impact 
of any downturn was enormous.  In fact, low 
interest rates meant bonds delivered lower results 
                                                             
4 Hans Wehr : 546. 
to pension fund managers. They were desperate to 
earn enough to cover their expected future 
payments. As a result, massive amounts of money 
poured into hedge funds.  Consequently, the choc 
was big and general. 
Hedging is acceptable in condition that it matches 
with a number of Islamic contracts that aimed at 
minimizing risks and unwanted circumstances and 
aligns with one of the general objective of 
Shari’ah which is the protection of Wealth.  
Indeed, the IFSB insisted on its 1st IFSB on the 
primordial necessity to implement a Risk 
Management Process within Islamic Banks (IB). 
To quote “IIFS shall have in place a 
comprehensive risk management and reporting 
process, including appropriate board and senior 
management oversight, to identify, measure, 
monitor, report and control relevant categories of 
risks and, where appropriate, to hold adequate 
capital against these risks. The process shall take 
into account appropriate steps to comply with 
Shari’ah rules and principles and to ensure the 
adequacy of relevant risk reporting to the 
supervisory authority”.   
Dallah Al-Baraka (2002) in its Resolution 6/27 
describes the practice of hedging as “an agreement 
where parties agreed to enter into a contract in the 
future for the protection of the buyer and seller as 
a safeguard against fluctuations of the market 
rates”. Bases on this definition, we can say that 
the definition of hedging in Islamic finance is 
quiet similar to its definition in conventional 
finance which implies the existence of a general 
consensus among shari’ah scholars to the 
necessity of hedging.  
However, the question that arises is on which 
ground the practical framework of Islamic 
hedging instruments should come from. The 
reason to ask this question is that current hedging 
instruments in conventional finance mainly 
“derivatives” are based on a model of risk transfer 
that creates more risk in the system. In the case of 
risk transfer and shifting model, risk is 
commoditize through its separation from the 
original transaction. This process of 
commoditization of risk leads to its proliferation 
in the system. The normal result of this situation is 
more instability and therefore, more recurrent 
crisis.  
Consequently to that, Muslim scholars have 
created a new category of tolerated risk which 
shall be hedge against it. It is mainly based on risk 
sharing or, technically speaking, on a zero-sum 
Dr. Lahsen OUBDI et. Al. An Overview on the Practice and Issues of Hedging in Islamic Finance 
International Journal of Contemporary Research and Review, Vol. 8, Issue. 10, Page no: EL 20216-20223 
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.15520/ijcrr/2017/8/10/335                                                                              Page | 5 
game where the outcomes benefit to both 
counterparties and the element of excessive gharar 
is neutralized. 
Islamic Hedging Instruments: 
Islamic Options: 
The first type of instrument to be presented will 
based on the existing structure of Option 
contracts. A conventional financial option is often 
traded as a separate contract in itself. The contract 
involves a right to purchase or sell an underlying 
asset at a stipulated price within or at the end of a 
specified time period (Obaidullah, 1998). In such 
contracts, the possibility of conflicts between the 
parties because of their abrupt, irrational and 
wrong decisions is minimized because of the 
period between the entering into the contract and 
the settlement date. Another important reason may 
be that under conditions of excessive Gharar or 
uncertainty regarding the article of exchange, 
price etc., options for the parties are provided to 
reduce Gharar and bring it within Islamically 
acceptable limits (Obaidullah, 1998). 
Options are often unacceptable in the Sharia’ah. 
However, there is no consensus regarding the 
specific objections to options.  
Some contemporary scholars, such as, (Abu 
Sulayman, 1992), (Kamali, 1995), who have 
attempted an evaluation of such contracts, have 
used a generic term, al-ikhtiyarat, a variant of the 
term al-khiyar, which normally is the classical 
Fiqh concept for various kinds of embedded 
options, as mentioned above. (Abu Sulayman, 
1992) uses the terms ikhtiyar al-talab, ikhtiyar al-
daf, and fatrah at-ikhtiyar for describing call 
options, put options, and option period 
respectively. Furthermore, the view of some 
Shari’ah scholars is that an option is a promise to 
sell or purchase a thing at a specific price within a 
stipulated time and such a promise in itself 
permissible. The promise is also binding on the 
promisor. However, this promise cannot be the 
subject matter of a sale or purchase. 
The problematic issue about the use of options in 
Islamic Finance includes prohibition of gambling 
(Maysir), unnecessary risk taking (Gharar), and of 
transactions based on ignorance (Jahl), trading in 
permitted (Halal) products only, presence of 
mutual consent for entering into or canceling 
contracts and the nature of the underlying asset 
(mal). 
As the options are not an interest based product on 
itself, their use should not defer form conventional 
banks to Islamic banks. Hence, two main 
applications can be deduced in the existing 
literature: Bay’ Al-urbun & Al-istijrar. 
Al-istijrar: 
It involves two parties, a buyer which could be a 
company seeking financing to purchase the 
underlying asset and a financial institution.  The 
contract has embedded options that could be 
triggered in the underlying asset’s price exceed 
certain bounds. The contract is complicated as it 
constitutes a combination of options, average 
prices and Murabahah or cots plus financing. A 
typical Istijrar transaction could be as follows; a 
company seeking short term working capital to 
finance the purchase of a commodity approaches a 
bank.  The bank purchases the commodity at the 
current price (Po), and resells it to the company for 
payment to be made at a mutually agreed upon 
date in the future.  The price at which settlement 
occurs on maturity is contingent on the underlying 
asset’s price movement from t0 to tn.  Where t0 is 
the day the contract was initiated and tn is the n
th 
day which would be the maturity day. Unlike a 
typical Murabahah contracts where P* = P0 (1+r) 
with P* is the price on maturity and r is the profit 
rates, the P* in Istijrar contract could be P* cited 
above or an average price P of the commodity 
between P0 and Pn. The embedded option is the 
right to choose to fix the price at which the 
settlement will occur at any time before maturity.  
The different prices are shown below: 
 
    
                                     PLB        P0         P*              PUB 
 
Where: P0: Purchasing price of the commodity 
            P*: Murabahah price 
            PLB: The lower bound price 
            PUB: The upper bound price 
The settlement price (Ps) at tn would be: 
Ps = P the average price of the commodity during the period if the price remained within the bounds 
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Ps = P* if the price exceeded the bounds. 
Accordingly, the payoffs of the contracts are as shown below: 
 
 
 
 
    If Pt < lower bound          Bank exercises Pt=P* 
    Bank loses, buyer gains until exercise 
 
Ps    If lower bound = Pt = upper bound         Ps = P̅ 
 
 
     If Pt > upper bound    Client exercises Ps = P* 
    Buyer loses, bank gains until exercise 
 
Fig.1. the Payoffs of Istijrar Contract 
 
Source: Financial Derivatives: Markets & Applications in Malaysia, Bacha (2012), p392 
 
Consequently, the exercise price of the option is 
based on the expectation of both counterparties on 
the fluctuation of the price of the assets during the 
period of the contract. However, in the case of an 
Islamic regulation sphere, the hedging instrument 
is no longer a zero-sum game as both parties get 
benefits from the contract from the sharing of risk 
in which the settlement price brings always 
benefit for both of them. 
Bay’ Al-urbun: 
Some scholars have justified the permissibility to 
options by drawing a parallel with Bay’ Al-urbun. 
Urbun refers to a sale in which the buyer deposits 
earnest money with the seller as a part payment of 
the price in advance but agrees that if he fails to 
ratify the contract he will forfeit the deposit 
money which the seller can keep. 
We can assimilate this Bay’ Al-urbun to a call 
optionin the sense that the seller does not return 
the premium or advance payment to the buyer. 
The accounting and Auditing Organization for 
Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI, 2008) in 
standard 1, trading in currencies, has pointed out 
the impermissibility of options in Shari’ah but has 
instead approved the use of Urbun. Moreover, the 
Shari’ah Advisory Council (SAC) concluded that 
the concept of bay` urbun is permissible and can 
be developed as an instrument in the Malaysian 
Islamic capital market. It has been a common 
practice in any society to pay a deposit in a 
business transaction so that the parties involved 
will not lose their rights within a certain given 
period. This does not contradict Shari’ah 
principles because it is `urfsahih to ensure the 
smooth running of a mu’amalah. Bay` `urbun is 
permissible because the hadith of the Prophet 
s.a.w. which indicates the prohibition is weak. 
The pricing of Bay’ Al-urbun will be defined by 
the famous formula of Black & Scholes. Many 
similitude can be spotted between bay’ Al-urbun 
and a call option. However, there is two main 
differences between the two instruments: 
 The deposit in the case of Bay’ Al-urbun is 
a part of the global price in the opposite of 
the premium paid which is a non-
refundable payment; 
 During the transaction, the bank should 
detain the underlying assets as Shari’ah 
forbids intangible financial transactions. 
The model will allow calculating the amount of 
urbun based on the possible outcomes of the 
underlying asset up to maturity under the 
assumption that prices follow a normal 
distribution with a Gaussian curve.  Thus, the 
price of the deposit will be determined as the 
mean of the possible intrinsic values weighted by 
their probabilities.  
IslamicFX Forward Contract: 
The basic mechanism for the application of this 
type as it is the only one offered by Islamic bank 
is the concept of wa’ad. Al-Wa’ad means promise 
which connotes an expression of willingness of a 
person or a group of persons on a particular 
subject matter. In a commercial transaction, a 
promise has a dual meaning. This is because, in a 
unilateral contract, the offer of the offeror is 
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known as promise, while in a bilateral contract, 
the acceptance of the offeree is known as promise 
as well (Salwani, 2008). This definition opens the 
door for multiple application of wa’ad within the 
framework of Islamic risk management especially 
in FX contract. In fact, a forward contract in the 
Forex market locks in the price at which an entity 
can buy or sell a currency on a future date. It is 
also known as “outright forward currency 
transaction”, “forward outright” of “FX forward”. 
Before detailing the use of wa’ad in FX contract, 
we must refer to the Malikis’ opinion on this 
issue. Indeed, Malikis’ scholar of thought does not 
permit promise done in currency transaction 
except on the spot or immediately. This is in 
parallel to the hadith of the prophet, Bello & 
Hassan (2013). This opinion is justified by the 
hadith of the prophet “gold for gold, silver for 
silver, wheat for wheat, barley for barley, dates for 
dates, salt for salt, like for like, equal for equal, 
and hand-to-hand (spot); if the commodities 
differ, then you may sell as you wish, provided 
that the exchange is hand-to-hand or spot 
transaction”5. However, Imam Shafi‘i permit 
promise of sale and purchase of currency as stated 
in Kitab al- Umm, “If two persons promise on 
currency there is no restriction for them to buy 
dirham, then both of them agree upon one of the 
price until they execute the sale and purchase 
agreement” (Bello & Hassan, 2013). 
Shari‘ah council of AAOIFI had explained that 
the original hukum for currency transaction is 
permissible, because it includes in the general 
provision of shari’ah which allow currency 
transaction. It is one of the sources of income as 
long as it is not contrary to Shari‘ah. However, 
Shari‘ah council of AAOIFI also decided that the 
promise in currency exchange which is mulzim in 
nature is prohibited as proclaimed by the 
consensus opinion of jurists. This is because the 
promise which is mulzim in nature by both parties 
is just like a formal contract. Should the promise 
is done by one party; it is permissible though it is 
mulzim in nature. 
As for those who recognized al-wa‘ad in currency 
exchange, the delivery of the exchange can be 
made within three days after the dealing which is 
still considered as spot according to the view of 
Imam Malik, who made an analogy with Salam 
                                                             
5Mishkat, on the authority of Bukhari’s “Tarik”, and Ibn 
Taymiyyah’s “Al Muntaqa” translation by M. ‘UmerChapra. See 
also Sunnah al-Bayhaqi, Kitab al-Buyu‘”, translation by 
‘UmerChapra. 
contract. Any time longer than that will amount to 
riba as the principle stated before. Therefore to 
avoid such thing and having a longer period with 
the fluctuation of the market price, here al-wa‘ad 
will come into the picture where it will take effect 
from the time the dealing is made without 
concluding any contract, until the delivery 
day.(Bello & Hassan, 2013). 
FX forward contracts based Islamic wa’dan is 
needed as it seeks to meet hajiyyahmaslahah of 
people. The hajiyyah is more prominent when it 
involves a larger organization such as a large 
investment bank or multinational companies 
seeking to hedge. The principle of wa’danalso 
required to make a hedging product that is 
comparable to conventional (Ahmad, Yaacob, & 
Mat Zain, 2014).  
In order to illustrate the concept of FX Forwards 
in IF, let us suppose a customer-IFI relation. The 
customer promises on the 1st of June 2017 to buy 
USD10 million form the IFI on the 1st of July 
2017 at the exchange rate of 9.95 MAD/USD. The 
customer is bound by the unilateral promise. 
On the 1st July 2017, the IFI pays USD10 million 
to the customer and receives MAD99.7 million 
form him. 
The currency exchange is complete and the 
customer receives USD10 million with the agreed 
exchange rate regardless of the market rate. 
Futures: 
The only tradable Future contract with shari’ah 
compliance is Crude Palm Oil Future (CPOF) in 
Malaysia. In spite of the existence of many 
shari’ah rulings against the use of futures6, the 
Shari’ah Advisory Council (SAC) in Malaysia in 
its eleventh meeting, on November 26, 1997, 
resolved that the Crude Palm Oil Futures (CPOF) 
is in accordance with shari’ah principles. The 
                                                             
6The ruling of the Islamic Fiqh Academy of the Muslim World 
League IFA-MWA in 1985 (as cited in Al-amine, 2008: 14). The 
IFA-OIC in 1992 resolved for relatively the same reasons 
advanced by the IFA-MWL that commodity future contract are 
prohibited as both payment and delivery take place in the future. 
The AAOIFI issued a ruling in 2004 that categorically prohibit 
commodity future contract. Indeed, the organization confirmed that 
futures are prohibited neither forming them nor trading them. The 
basis for this ruling if the verse in surat Al-nisa’ (4:29). 
 
Dr. Lahsen OUBDI et. Al. An Overview on the Practice and Issues of Hedging in Islamic Finance 
International Journal of Contemporary Research and Review, Vol. 8, Issue. 10, Page no: EL 20216-20223 
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.15520/ijcrr/2017/8/10/335                                                                              Page | 8 
SAC ruled that CPOF are free from elements of 
Gharar and Maysir; and even of such elements 
exist, the trading regulations have overcome them 
(Securities Commission, 2006: 75). 
On the issue of delivery date, the SAC argued that 
there is no element of gharar in the crude palm oil 
futures contract as, when the contract is offered, 
specifications such as its quantity, type, price and 
delivery date are made known to market players. 
However looking into the crude palm oil contract 
specification, it only provides for the delivery or 
tender period to be on the 1st business day to the 
20th business day of the delivery month; or if the 
20th is a non-market day, then the next preceding 
business day (Securities Industry Development 
Corporation, 2007). Hence, the question is 
whether this tender period could amount to gharar.  
On the issue of the sale of a non-existent or non-
possessed crude palm oil, the SAC argued that this 
issue is not relevant. According to the SAC, the 
prohibition of bayʿmaʿdum (buying something 
that does not exist) is due to the element of 
uncertainty in handing over the sold goods and not 
due to the non-existence of the object at the time 
when the contract is being made. In support of this 
proposition, the SAC refers to salam and istisna’. 
In the contract of istisna’ the subject matter of 
istisna’ is definitely non-existent at the time of the 
contract while the subject matter of salam may be 
non-existent (Securities Commission, 2006). 
Furthermore, the SAC argued that there is no 
element of gharar as the contract can be settled in 
cash before the maturity date or by delivery on the 
maturity date. The SAC supported their argument 
with the existence of the Clearing House which 
ensures the delivery and settlement of crude palm 
oil futures contracts. Even if there is gharar, it is 
eliminated by the crude palm oil futures contract 
trading regulation which provides for surveillance 
and insurance against any cheating (Securities 
Commission, 2006). 
The main point of divergences between the 
different rulings could be sum up as follow: 
 The deferment of both counter-values 
 The sale of a non-existent CPO 
 The sale of debt. 
The main opinions expressed below belong to 
DrHashimKamali and Abdul Rahim Assaati 
(2002) whereby they promote a shari’ah-
compliant version of Futures.  
The general trend of the scholars who adhere to a 
permit the use of Futures can be resumed as 
follow: Azzam, al Khatib and Abd al Qadir share 
the view that the registration and clearance 
procedures, as well as the guarantee functions of 
the clearinghouse, are precise and that trading 
futures are conducted by trained professionals in a 
highly centralized and controlled market. The and 
its related procedures are such that the prospects 
of uncertainty and gharar were virtually 
eliminated. Thus, the conclusion is drawn that 
futures contracts are valid from the Shari’ah 
perspective (Kamali, 1996). 
However, the argument advanced previously on 
trading without actual transfer of the commodity 
or stock to the buyer, which is explicitly 
prohibited by the Prophet.”7 The Hadith cited in 
support addressed a companion, Hakim ibn 
Hizam, to “sell not what is not with you” can be 
further analyzed. 
 
Al Khatib records the view that this Hadith 
conveys moral guidance (irshad) rather than a 
prohibition per se.8 
Imam al Shafi’i has ruled that one may sell what 
one does not own provided that it is not a specific 
object, for delivery of a specific item cannot be 
guaranteed if the seller does not own it.9 In 
essence, this prohibition seeks to prevent gharar in 
sales that consists of uncertainty over delivery.10 
o The Sale of Non-possessed Crude Palm 
Oil: 
According to the Hanafis, qabd is not an essential 
requirement (rukn) of sale but rather a subsidiary 
condition, namely, that of effectiveness (shart al 
nifadh). This ruling led al-Kasani to point out that 
a valid sale can be concluded prior to the seller’s 
taking possession but that it will remain in 
abeyance until qabd has taken place11. Qabd is 
therefore, not a prerequisite of a valid contract, 
and it is perfectly lawful to postpone it to a later 
date. Ibn Rushd confirmed this and stated, “There 
is no disagreement in the Maliki School that only 
food grains (mainly wheat and barley) cannot be 
sold prior to qabd.”  
                                                             
7 Muhammad Akram Khan, “Commodity Exchange and 
Stock Exchange in an Islamic Economy,” The American 
Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 5, no. 1 (Spring 1988): 
91. 
8 Al Khatib, al Siyasah al Maliyah, 176, note 29. 
9 Muhammad ibn Idris al Shafi’i, al Risalah, ed. Ahmad 
Muhammad Shakir (Cairo: Mustafa al Babi al Halabi, 
1940), 337. 
10 Al Khattabi, Ma’alim al Sunan, 5:143, note 29; see also al 
Qaradawi, Bay’ al Murabahah, 56, note 22. 
11 Al-Kasani, Bada’i[, note 38, 5:156,. 
Dr. Lahsen OUBDI et. Al. An Overview on the Practice and Issues of Hedging in Islamic Finance 
International Journal of Contemporary Research and Review, Vol. 8, Issue. 10, Page no: EL 20216-20223 
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.15520/ijcrr/2017/8/10/335                                                                              Page | 9 
 
o The Sale of Debt: 
A debt is normally created by a trader who enters 
the market either as buyer or seller without any 
physical exchange of values. The debt so 
originated may become the subject of an 
offset/reverse transaction which will trigger a 
series of sales and purchases essentially of the sale 
of debts. The offsetting transaction in futures can 
alsoconsistof offsetting a debt that one party owes 
to another. In this case, the settlement is done 
through the modality of sale and purchase. Bay’ 
al-dayn(sale of debt) basically envisaged sale over 
an unpaid debt involving either two, or in some 
cases, three parties. The reason of its prohibition 
was over uncertainty in its repayment. However, 
the situation is very different in the futures market 
now where all transactions are concluded over 
guaranteed debts. 
Ibn Qayyim’s examination of the source evidence 
on bay’ al-dayn also led him to the conclusion that 
“there is neither explicit nor implicit text in the 
Shari’ah on its prohibition. On the contrary the 
principles of Shari’ah indicate its 
permissibility.”12 
o Deferment of both counter-values: 
Rafiq al-Misri has argued that there is no extra 
gharar in deferring both counter values compared 
to the deferment of one of them only. If one of the 
counter values has been delivered while the other 
is deferred to a future date, or when both are so 
deferred, the level of risk would be the same and 
no additional gharar is likely when both are 
deferred. Suppose that the buyer in a deferred 
payment sale receives the commodity but defers 
the payment of price, it is possible that the price 
fluctuates during the interval, and one of the 
parties suffers the consequences. It could be the 
seller if the spot price goes up or the buyer if it 
goes down. It should be noted that in the case 
ofsalam sale, the risk will be about the same even 
if both counter values were deferred. Of course, in 
the case of deferment of one counter value one of 
the parties to the contract will benefit from the 
receipt of the commodity.. If both counter values 
were deferred, both parties will share the risk and 
the expected gharar would be about the same. 
Thus there is no ground for the claim that gharar 
would be greater if both counter values are 
                                                             
12 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, I[lam al-Muwaqqiin, Beirut: 
Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, 1991, Vol. II, p. 9. 
deferred. Misri added that the Hadith of al-kali 
bil-kali is actually not authentic.13 
o Uncertainties over Commodity Future 
Market: 
Existing data do not confirm the suspicion that 
future trading is dominated by large speculators. 
Data may vary from market to market, but, 
regardless of market, the total holdings of large 
speculators’ long and short positions are less than 
20 percent of the total holdings of small traders. 
Large speculators probably constitute less than 2 
percent of the total futures trading population14. 
Major Price movements are usually caused by 
basic changes in the supply or demand for a given 
item and only rarely by a group of speculators 
creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. Evidence 
obtained from considerable research suggests that 
“speculation probably does more to smooth price 
fluctuation than to increase it”15. Research on the 
behavior pattern of such goods as onions and live 
beef cattle before and after the institution of 
futures markets have supported, on the whole, the 
conclusion that future trading has not increased 
price fluctuation in the cash market16. Statistical 
analysis shows that the volatility of futures prices 
is approximately the same as that of equity 
prices17. 
Eventually, the discussion on the permissibility of 
Future contract in general is still a hot spot among 
shari’ah scholars. However, we should not ignore 
that it is widely recognized that commodity 
futures markets allow commercial hedgers such as 
farmers and producers to hedge their commodity 
price risk, as emphasized by the longstanding 
hedging pressure theory of commodity futures 
prices (e.g., Keynes, 1930; Hicks, 1939; 
Hirshleifer, 1988). There is little doubt that futures 
markets for agricultural commodities provide 
important economic benefits. Trading 
standardized agricultural commodities for future 
delivery on organized exchanges permits an 
efficient mechanism for hedging and provides a 
                                                             
13Rafiq al-Misri, al-Jami’ fi Usul al-Riba, Damascus: Dar 
al-Qalam, 1991, p. 339f, as quoted in al-Amine, “Futures 
Trading”, p. 79. 
14Teweles, Commodity Futures, note 11, p. 31; Courtney, 
Investor’s Guide, note 97, p. 53. 
15Teweles, Commodity Futures, n. 11, p. 13; Courtney, 
Investor’s Guide, n. 97, p. 52. 
16 Courtney, Investor’s Guide, 51. 
17 For details on these studies, see Frank K. Relly, 
Investment Analysis and Portfolio Management (Chicago: 
the Dryden Press, 1985, pp. 792-793. 
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forum for establishing and disseminating price 
information. These so-called risk-transfer and 
price-discovery functions of futures markets are 
the main benefit which multiple studies, 
(Kristoufek & Vosvrda, 2014) show that future 
market leads to more economic efficiency in a 
way that such instruments improve the farmers’ 
competitiveness. Moreover, the informational role 
of future markets is due to the lack of centralized 
trading in spot markets for commodities, 
centralized futures markets serve as an important 
platform for aggregating dispersed information 
regarding supply and demand of commodities. 
Consequently, in the case of Malaysia, future 
market could help farmers and government, as it 
relies on this sector for its budget income, to 
stabilize the prices and provide an efficient for 
forecasts.  
Conclusion: 
The main challenge that impedes the development 
of a risk management industry within Islamic 
finance is the behavior of relying on existing 
conventional instruments. These instruments are 
not the best model draw from because their core 
conception is based on interest and excessive risk 
taking which both do not comply with shari’ah 
guidance. Hence, the necessity for establishing a 
proper instrument to Islamic finance should be a 
high priority for practitioners and scholars. The 
process of engineering such instrument must 
exclusively be based on a risk sharing model.  
Protection of one property is an essential pillar of 
Maqasid al-shari’ah, thus hedging would be for no 
harm to Muslim community. Furthermore, the 
nature of the current economic trends and 
business, pushes to more effort in Islamic Risk 
Management to offset the extremely volatile 
market. Also, the basic norm of Shari’ah is 
prohibition (al-hazar) in the field of ‘ibadat 
(worship matters) and it is permissibility (ibahah) 
in mu’amalat and commercial transactions. 
Nothing in this latter area must be declared 
forbidden without decisive and indisputable 
evidence. Consequently, in the light of the 
argument advanced, there is no decisive evidence 
on the prohibition of hedging, it is then 
permissibile in Shari’ah. A transaction is valid 
from the Shari’ah perspective when it does not 
include riba, and it does not partake in excessive 
gharar.The instruments advance above would fall 
under the basic principle of permissibility, with 
the condition to undertake in a continuous process 
to establish vigilance and develop more refined 
safeguards against abuse, excessive speculation, 
and gharar.  
Consequently, the issue of hedging instruments 
should be approached from another perspective 
away from the common fiqhi discussion about 
uncertainties and gambling. Research should be 
conducted in order to measure the real impact of 
such instruments on the real economy and the lost 
incurred in case hedging is not practiced. The 
logic that should frame these researches is a 
balance to find the right path to integrate futures 
among our financial system.  
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